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TRANSFER PRICING: UN GUIDELINES – BRAZIL
Richard Ainsworth
The UN Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries1
endeavors to provide “clearer guidance on the policy and administrative aspects of
applying transfer pricing analysis.”2 Chapter 10 is particularly noteworthy. It sets out
specific country practices. The rules in Brazil, China, India and South Africa are offered
as templates for developing countries to follow.
This article considers the Brazilian contribution to Chapter 10. Although some
writers believe that developing countries should adopt the Brazilian model this article
suggests otherwise.3 Even though it is a theoretically simple system, some aspects of the
Brazilian model consistently work to the fiscal disadvantage of the country adopting it.
As a general matter, this is not a transfer pricing regime that should be widely emulated
by developing countries.
In particular, developing countries that offer low cost manufacturing opportunities
to MNEs and those that offer market access to an expanding middle class may be
disappointed to learn that the Brazilian transfer pricing regime systematically shifts
income out of the country. The problem is mainly with the import rules.
Stated another way, countries that seek economic development by attracting
manufacturing, or that seek commercial development by providing ready access to
consumers willing to pay a premium for foreign products, will almost certainly loose
revenue if they approach transfer pricing as Brazil does. This does not seem to be a
model that the UN’s Practical Manual should be advocating without qualification, and
the Practical Manual offers no critique.
Two Elements
All transfer pricing regimes are composed of two elements – a set of rules that
determine whether or not parties are related and a second set of rules that specify the
methods that evaluate whether or not prices between those related parties are at arm’s
length. In Brazilian transfer pricing both of these elements diverge from the OECD
standard.

1

UN, Department of Economics & Social Affairs, ST/ESA/347 (May 2013) available at:
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Manual_TransferPricing.pdf
2
UN, Practical Manual, Foreword.
3
Tatiana Falcao, Brazil’s Approach to Transfer Pricing: A Viable Alternative to the Status Quo? 20 TAX
MANAGEMENT TRANSFER PRICING REPORT 20:1 (February 23, 2012). Eliete Ribeiro, Brazil: Cost Plus
Profit Margin Method an Alternative for MNEs? TRANSFER PRICING INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL (April 12,
2012); Also see: Brazilian Transfer Pricing – A Practical Approach. Could this be a Model for Developing
Countries? powerpont presentation Tax Justice Network & Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Finland (June
2010); Brazilian Transfer Pricing – A Practical Approach. Could this be an Inspiration for Latin
American Countries? subsequent and updated powerpont presentation offered in Guatemala.
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The discussion in Chapter 10 only considers the second set of rules for Brazil –
the transfer pricing methods. As a result, it seems fair to conclude that the Practical
Manual is not recommending the adoption of the Brazilian definitions of related parties.4
The Practical Manual does however seem to recommend serious consideration of the
Brazilian transfer pricing methods.
Brazil’s related party rules are clear and objective, but they are complex. It is
entirely possible that parties deemed to be related under Brazilian rules are not related
under OECD rules. This leads to cross-border difficulties. The most awkward aspect is
when the Brazilian rules pull into the transfer pricing statutes all transactions with tax
4

Article 2 of Treasury Ruling No. 243/02 deems the following parties to be a related party of a Brazilian
taxpayer:
(1) the parent company, domiciled abroad;
(2) a branch (or agency), domiciled abroad;
(3) a person (or legal entity) resident or domiciled abroad whose interest in the capital of the Brazilian
taxpayer characterizes it as a controlling shareholder, or affiliated party under Brazilian corporate
law;
(4) a legal entity, domiciled abroad, that is characterized as a controlled entity or affiliate party of the
Brazilian taxpayer under Brazilian corporate law;
(5) a legal entity, domiciled abroad, when that entity and the Brazilian entity are under common
corporate or administrative control, or when at least 10% of the capital of each entity is owned by
the same person or legal entity;
(6) a person or legal entity, resident or domiciled abroad that, together with the Brazilian taxpayer,
holds an equity interest in the capital of a third legal entity, and whose sum of equity interest
characterizes them as controlling shareholders or affiliated parties of this third legal entity, as
defined under Brazilian corporate law;
(7) a person or legal entity, resident or domiciled abroad, that is associated in any enterprise, in the
form of a consortium or condominium, as defined under Brazilian law;
(8) the person, resident abroad, who is a relative up to the third family degree (as defined under
Brazilian law), the spouse or companion of the Brazilian company’s management or direct or
indirect controlling shareholder;
(9) a person or legal entity, resident or domiciled abroad, which has exclusive rights, as agent or
distributor, to purchase and sell goods, services or rights of the Brazilian taxpayer;
(10) a person or legal entity. Resident or domiciled abroad, which has the Brazilian entity as the
exclusive agent or distributor to purchase or sell goods, services or rights.
In addition, under Article 2, paragraph 5 of Treasury Ruling 243/02, any transaction carried out by an
entity in Brazil through an interposed party (third party) who is not considered a related party, is considered
a transaction with a related party if that interposed party deals with another party that is a related party to
the Brazilian taxpayer.
Under Article 39 of Treasury Ruling 243/02 transfer pricing rules apply to any international transaction
carried put with a person or legal entity (whether related or not) that is domiciled in jurisdictions where
there is no income tax, or where income is taxed at a maximum rate below 20%, or in a jurisdiction where
applicable laws prohibit the disclosure of equity ownership. [Treasury Ruling 188/02 provides a list of
these jurisdictions.]
Finally, transfer pricing rules apply to transactions performed under “privileged tax regimes” under
Article 23 of Law No. 11,727/08. A privileged tax regime includes:
(1) regimes where income is not taxed or taxed at a maximum rate of less than 20%;
(2) regimes where advantages are given to entities or individuals – without any substantial
withholding requirements, contingent on the absence of substantial economic activity in the
country, that does not tax or taxes at a maximum rate below 20%, the income earned outside of its
territory, and does not allow access to information related to the corporate structure, ownership of
the goods o services or the rights involved or the economic transactions performed.
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havens by deeming entities there to be related to any Brazilian taxpayer that deals with
them. Very few jurisdictions follow this approach.
Brazil’s Simplicity of Methods
Brazil’s transfer pricing methods are a different story from the related party rules.
Brazil’s quest for simplicity is apparent throughout its transfer pricing methodologies.
Simplicity starts at the beginning – Brazil only accepts traditional OECD methodologies.
These are the most basic, most intuitive methods – the comparable uncontrolled price, the
resale price and the cost plus methods. It expressly rejects the profit methods – profit
split, the transactional net margin method, as well as formulary apportionment.
As a general rule, Brazil takes the OECD’s traditional methods, and then
simplifies them further. Brazil does not demand a difficult transaction-by-transaction
analysis under the resale price (RPM), cost-plus (CPM) or even the comparable
uncontrolled price (CUP) method.5 It allows annual averages to be used, and then
prescribes statutory fixed margins instead of using comparable transactions to determine
gross margins and mark-ups. As Tatiana Falcao indicates:
The Brazilian transfer pricing system is unique in that Brazil has
developed an objective method that allows the taxpayer to mathematically
determine and prove its pricing benchmark without having to go through a
search for comparables. … The search for comparables is one of the main
concerns of developing countries, which do not have wide and open
markets providing accessible information and reports about competing
companies commercializing comparable or similar products. Sometimes,
a company might be the only producer of a specific type of product,
making the search for comparables impracticable if not impossible.6
But Brazil’s simplification efforts go even further. Brazil applies neither a “best
method”7 nor a “most appropriate method” rule.8 The Brazilian position is that a
taxpayer may select any method, even if the reason for selecting a method is simply that
it results in a lower tax result. A recently added exception restricts a taxpayer’s ability to
change methods after an audit has begun, but other than this there is complete freedom of
choice.
In addition, Brazil does not apply transfer pricing rules to domestic transactions.
An arm’s length price only needs to be benchmarked if it is a cross-border dealing. At
this juncture however there is a complexity. It is a superficial complexity in the Brazilian

5

Elen Peixoto Orsini & Daniel Gustavo Orsini Marcondes, Brazil: Recent Changes in Transfer Pricing
Rules, INT’L. TRANSFER PRICING J. (January/February 2013) 26, 29. A recent addition to the law
incorporates a limited comparable uncontrolled price method for commodities that is very close to the
OECD approach in this area. UN, Practical Manual, ¶ 10.2.1.2.
6
Tatiana Falcao, Brazil’s Approach, at 1.
7
The best method rule is a US transfer pricing expression, and can be found at Treas. Reg §1.482-1(c).
8
The OECD’s expression is that the “most appropriate method” needs to be selected. This principle was
added to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations at
¶ 2.1 (2010).
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design. The statute and the rules are always binary; always distinguishing between
import and export transactions.
The complexity is visible when considering Brazil’s CUP method. There may
appear to be two methods, not one. The Preços Independentes Comparados (PIC)
applies for imports, and the Preço de Venda nas Exportações (PVEx) applies for exports.
However, what we are looking at is really one method. There is very little theoretical
difference between the PIC and the PVEx. There is only a difference in the factual
underpinnings (one name is used if the transaction is an import, the other is used if the
transaction involves an export).
The same duality appears in the recent rules for commodity CUPs – with the
Preço sob Cotação na Importação, (PCI) applying to commodity imports and the Preço
sob Cotação na Exportação, (PECEX) applying to commodity exports. As this
legislative approach continues through the RPM and the CPM the superficial complexity
multiplies (again) as the statute allows each of these methods to be used with domestic or
foreign data. In other words, methods can be applied from either a Brazilian or a foreign
vantage point.
What this means, for example, is that when a taxpayer is benchmarking an arm’s
length price between a Brazilian exporter and a related foreign buyer, the calculus can be
done either by applying a CPM to the Brazilian exporter, or by applying a RPM to the
foreign buyer. Needless to say, Brazilian data will be more readily accessible and
verifiable. Foreign data is almost always incomplete or unavailable. Thus, the CPM is
almost always used for exports.
The UN Practical Manual considers this complexity to be a distraction.
Developing countries are encouraged to “see through” this thicket, and seize the
underlying simplicity of the Brazilian approach, because the practical outcome is
exceedingly simple. Arms length prices will almost always be benchmarked from the
accounts of the Brazilian party, and this means the RPM is the method for imports and
the CPM is the method for exports. As the UN Practical Manual observes:
However, due to information accessibility RPM is usually more suitable
when the Brazilian company imports, and CPM is usually more suitable
when the Brazilian company exports, … 9
In the following sections Brazil’s simplified CUP, CPM and RPM will be
considered. Systematic income shifting is a flaw in the Brazilian system, but it is
confined mostly to the RPM where Brazil endeavors to use domestic data to benchmark
the arm’s length price for almost any import. The problems with the RPM are considered
in the third sub-section.
(1) Brazil’s Simplified CUPs
Preços Independentes Comparados (PIC) – for imports;
9

UN, Practical Manual, ¶ 10.2.4.
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Preço de Venda nas Exportações (PVEx) – for exports;
Preço sob Cotação na Importação, (PCI) – for commodity imports;
Preço sob Cotação na Exportação, (PECEX) – for commodity exports
None of Brazil’s CUP-like methods present difficulties. They are not as flexible
as the OECD’s methods, but they are very workable. They do not however, play a
significant role in the UN’s Practical Manual. There is only brief mention of them at
paragraph 10.2.8.1, and the assumption seems to be that there is very little to learn from
the Brazilian CUPs that is not already well understood in the field.
The Brazilian equivalent to the comparable uncontrolled price, Preços
Independentes Comparados (PIC),10 sets a benchmark price with the weighted arithmetic
average of purchases and sales, between unrelated parties (in Brazil or in other countries)
of the same or similar assets, goods, services, or rights under similar payment conditions.
PIC is used in pricing imports.11
Preço de Venda nas Exportações (PVEx) is the same method applied to export
transactions. Adjustments are required for the PIC and PVEx. However, unlike the
OECD where any adjustment that improves comparability is allowable, Brazil limits and
specifies the adjustments that can be made. All other adjustments are rejected.12 The
intent is to provide judicial certainty in mathematical precision.
Brazil recently added two new CUP methods to its transfer pricing regime,
effective January 1, 2013 - Preço sob Cotação na Importação, (PCI) – for imports, and
Preço sob Cotação na Exportação, (PECEX) – for exports.13 These are mandatory
methods, and only apply to commodities.
PCT and PECEX differ from all other Brazilian transfer pricing methods. They
are not based on annual average prices. PCT and PECEX are transaction-by-transaction
10

For exports the same PIC rules apply, although the statute references Preço de Venda nas Exportações
(PVEx) as the method because the Brazilian transfer pricing regime distinguishes import rules from export
rules.
11
The specific comparable transactions are:
(1) the same or similar assets, goods, services, or rights sold by the same foreign related party to
unrelated legal entities, with or without domicile in Brazil;
(2) the same or similar assets, goods, services, or rights purchased by the same Brazilian company
from an unrelated legal entity, with or without domicile in Brazil; or
(3) the same or similar assets, goods, services, or rights purchased or sold between unrelated legal
entities, with or without domicile in Brazil.
12
Article 9 of IN SRF 243/02 lists payment terms, quantities sold, guarantees offered, marketing/
advertising obligations, costs with quality standards and quality control, packaging costs, brokerage fees
due to unrelated parties, freight and insurance for identical assets, goods, services, or rights. Article 10 of
IN SRF 243/02 indicates that if the assets, goods, services, or rights are similar, then in addition to the
adjustments above, the prices must be adjusted for differences in the physical characteristics and content of
the comparable items, considering their production and development costs exclusively related to
differences.
13
Law 12,715, converting Provision Measure 563, published in the Official Gazette on September 18,
2012.
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methodologies that determine a benchmark through the averaging of published
commodity prices from public exchanges on the transaction date.
(2) Brazil’s Simplified CPMs
Custo de Aquisição ou Produção mais Tributos e Lucro (CAP) – for exports
Custo de Produção mais Lucro (CPL) – for imports
For both the CAP and the CPL the weighted average of the production costs of
the goods, services or rights is the base amount. A statutory profit margin is the added
plus. This margin is 20% in the case of Brazilian imports under the CPL, and 15% in the
case of Brazilian exports under the CAP.
In the case of the CPL the relevant production costs are in the country where the
supply is originally manufactured. Practical difficulties in doing this become apparent
when the details of the Brazilian legislation are considered. In addition to direct costs,
(the costs of any goods, services or rights used or consumed in the manufacturing
process), there needs to be taken into account amounts for reasonable losses,
depreciation, leases, and maintenance expenses related to the production.14 The
benchmark could be calculated by using the production costs of similar assets, goods,
services or rights (as adjusted for differences).
Needless to say, performing a calculation with this kind of detail for the CAP is
far easier than doing so for the CPL. All of the data that is needed is in the accounts of
the Brazilian taxpayer. It is easy to see why Brazil’s simplified CPM is used primarily
for export transactions (and avoided for imports).

14

IN SRF 243.
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Figure 1 presents the CAP and CPL methods side-by-side. The difference
between the 20% and 15% markup-ups shows the differential impact of the two methods
on the same cost base (assuming that data is equally available to determine CAP and
CPL. There is a clear bias favoring exports (15%) and discouraging imports (20%). The
same bias can be seen in Brazil’s safe harbor rules that are applicable only for export
transactions. Exports are preferred.15
(3) Brazil’s Simplified RPMs
Preço de revenda menos lucro (PRL) – for imports
Preço de Venda por Atacado no País de Destino, Diminuído do Lucro (PVA) –
for wholesale exports
Preço de Venda a Varejo no País de Destino, Diminuído do Lucro (PVV) –
for retail exports
As with Brazil’s CUPs and CPMs the resale price method (RPM) is also binary –
there is a set of methods for imports and another set for exports. For the same reason that
the CPM is the dominant method for benchmarking exports, the Preço de revenda menos
lucro (PRL), Brazil’s simplified resale price method, is the dominant method for
benchmarking imports.
The preference is apparent in the application. It is exceptionally difficult to use
the resale price method for exports. To do so requires the Brazilian related party to have
detailed accounting data from the foreign related party.16
Prior to January 1, 2013 the PRL was applied with two different profit margins –
20% if the imported item was resold without substantial modification by the Brazilian
related party, (a wholly owned distributor, for example); 60% if the imported item was
used in the production of a new end product. Law 12,715, which came into effect
January 1, 2013, made significant changes to these margins, and how they are applied.
First, PRL margins are no longer distinguished based on whether imports are
immediately resold “as is” (PRL 20), as opposed to being used as an input in further
domestic manufacturing (PRL 60). The new classifications are based on market sectors.

15

For example Brazilian transfer price rules apply to exports only if the average export price is less than
90% of the average price of the same or similar good, service or right sold in the Brazilian market to
unrelated parties, during the same period and under similar payment conditions. In addition, if an exporter
is attempting to enter a new market, related party transactions are not subject to transfer pricing adjustment.
This rule does not apply in the case of exports to low tax, or privileged tax jurisdictions (other restrictions
and conditions apply).
16
The Preço de Venda por Atacado no País de Destino, Diminuído do Lucro (PVA) methodology applies a
15% mark-up to the weighted arithmetic average of the sales price of similar or identical goods sold in the
wholesale market of the destination country. The Preço de Venda a Varejo no País de Destino, Diminuído
do Lucro (PVV) methodology applies a 30% mark-up to the weighted arithmetic average of the sales price
of similar or identical goods sold in the retail market of the destination country.
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Secondly, the new rules have three statutory margins – 40%, 30% and 20% – rather than
two.17
A simple distributor fact patterns is the easiest example to explain the PRL.
Assume A, a foreign entity, is related to B, a Brazilian entity. B imports goods from A as
a wholesale/ distributor for resale in Brazil, notably to C, an independent third party
retailer. C pays 10,000 currency units (after reduction for unconditional discounts, taxes,
contributions on sales commissions and brokerage fees).
The benchmarking question is, what is highest price that B should pay A, if the
statutory gross margin is 20%? This is the transfer price, or the “parameter price” under
Brazilian law. In terms of the UN’s Practical Manual, this is the “deemed arm’s length
price.” The answer: B should not pay more than 8,000 currency units to A (Figure 2).

17

The UN Practical Manual at ¶10.2.2.11 indicates:
• A 40% rate applies in the following sectors:
o Pharmaceutical chemicals and pharmaceuticals;
o Tobacco products;
o Equipment and cinematographic;
o Optical instruments, photographic and
o Machinery, apparatus and equipment for use in dental, medical and
hospital;
o Petroleum, and natural gas (mining industry), and
o Petroleum products (derived from oil refineries and alike).
• A 30% rate applies in the following sectors:
o Chemicals (other than pharmaceutical chemicals and pharmaceuticals);
o Glass and glass products;
Pulp, paper and paper products; and
o Metallurgy.

A 20% rate applies in all other cases.
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This example is unrealistically simple. It assumes that B adds no substantial
value to the imported goods. The Brazilian system refers to this “value adding” element
as the participation ratio, and in this case because the imported goods are re-sold almost
“as is,” the participation ratio is 100%. The imported goods, from A, constitute the entire
(100% of the) resold product to C.
But what if B adds value with additional domestic inputs? What if the end
product was only partially comprised of the imported supply from A? In this case
Brazil’s participation ratios come into play. Prior to January 1, 2013, participation ratios
only factored into analysis with PRL 60. Under the current statute they are always
considered.
For example, assume that instead of simply re-selling goods, services or rights, B
adds value by further manufacturing. Local costs are part of the total cost of goods sold,
thus detailed cost data from the internal cost charts of firm B are needed to determine the
participation ratios.
Two percentages complete the hypothetical: the participation percentage and the
fixed margin percentage. In this example, we assume that the imported goods are 40% of
the total cost of goods sold, and the statutory fixed margin is 30%. Figure 3 demonstrates
the results.

9
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In this figure B is selling the goods of the same value as in Figure 2 (10,000
currency units), but here only 60% of the cost of the goods are imported. The other 40%
of the cost of the goods is derived from local content.
This is not a distributor fact pattern. B is a Brazilian manufacturer that imports
some of its factors of production. As a result, the PRL applies only to the resale of 6,000
currency units. How much should B pay A for these inputs; the inputs it has resold for
6,000? The answer is 4,200 currency units.
If Brazil is committed to expanding its manufacturing base through foreign direct
investment, this becomes a critical fact pattern. Facilitating foreign business investment
in local Brazilian manufacturing to sell on to Brazilian retailers is the goal of an
economic development program. Should that investment come at the expense of a
rational transfer pricing system?
The First Flaw in the PRL
The cost of Domestic Supplies
The PRL is a flawed methodology if we accept the Chinese position in the UN
Practical Manual. According to the Chinese, developing countries struggle with three
aspects of transfer pricing: (1) the lack of appropriate comparables (searchable data bases
of publicly available companies operating within developing countries) (2) quantification
and allocation of location-specific advantages (notably the Location Specific Advantages
– LSAs – of low cost work force and materials as well as a domestic market willing to

10
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pay premium prices for foreign products) and (3) the identification and valuation of
intangibles.18
In a static hypothetical the PRL’s flaw is not immediately visible, but when the
fact pattern is set into a dynamic framework the problem is very apparent. Assume for
example that the cost for manufacturing in Brazil is at the global norm – labor, raw
materials, real property costs, transportation, as well as all costs of government
regulation. If a Brazilian manufacturer in the glass and glass products sector (with a 30%
statutory fixed margin) imports 60% of its factors of production, then an outcome like
that in Figure 3 would be expected.
But what if the reason for setting up the Brazilian manufacturing operation was
not a neutral decision, but was a decision motivated by an effort to take advantage of
significantly lower production costs in Brazil. If all other costs remain the same as in
Figure 3, except that Brazilian factors of production are now 10% (instead of 40%) of
total costs, then the parameter price, the transfer price, or in terms of the UN’s Practical
Manual, the “deemed arm’s length price” for the imported goods, services or rights rises
to 6,300 currency units from 4,200 currency units (Figure 4).

The Chinese objection to this outcome is apparent. At standard (global) costs, the
arm’s length price for the imported factors of production is 4,200 currency units. The
only reason for the price increase to 6,300 currency units is the low wage structure, low
18

UN, Practical Manual, ¶¶ 10.3.1.2 & 10.3.3.1 - .3.
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raw material costs, or low real property costs in Brazil. In other words, the value of the
LSAs is being transferred out of Brazil through the transfer price.
As the local economy develops the pricing structure for local inputs will change –
probably moving upward. If we assume that the local wage structure, and the cost of
other factors of production rise so that they represent 30% of total costs there is
downward pressure on the transfer price for imported supplies. In this case the parameter
price, or the “deemed arm’s length price” for the imported goods, services or rights falls
to 4,900 currency units (Figure 5).

The Second Flaw in the PRL
Premium Prices in the Domestic Market
There is a second flaw in the PRL. The Chinese submission to the UN’s Practical
Manual, developing countries with a rising middle class commonly have a domestic
market that is anxious to pay a premium for foreign goods or services. If this is the case,
then the PRL has a second structural flaw that also shifts profits out of the domestic
market through transfer prices.
Assume the same facts as in Figure 3, except that the Brazilian consumers are
willing to pay a premium price for the product. Instead of 10,000 currency units, assume
that the market will allow 15,000 currency units to be charged by B for the same quantity
of glass products. In this fact pattern the parameter price, or the “deemed arm’s length
price” for the imported goods rises from 4,200 to 6,300 currency units. There is a strong
argument that most of the additional 5,000 currency units in premium profits should
remain in the developing country, but that is not what happens under the PRL (Figure 6).
12
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Conclusion
The Brazilian chapter in the UN’s Practical Manual describes the simplified
transfer methodologies that are currently used in Brazil. The methods adopt and further
simplify the OECD’s CUP RSP and CPM methods. The mathematical simplicity of the
Brazilian methods make them attractive, and have encouraged some to advocate that they
be adopted by other developing countries.
A note of caution is warranted however. There are a number of elements of the
Brazilian transfer pricing regime that function more like export stimuli, and foreign direct
investment stimuli, than functioning like true (objective) transfer pricing provisions.
Particular attention needs to be given to the PRL. It is possible that the
commercial profile of a developing country that adopts the Brazilian methodology may
produce an “arm’s length price” that seems very wrong. For an extreme example, if the
facts of Figure 3 are adjusted to reflect the presence of both low cost domestic inputs (as
in Figure 4), and premium prices paid for foreign products (as in Figure 6), then the
“arm’s length price” that B should pay to A for foreign inputs rises to 9,150 currency
units (Figure 7).
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In the series of examples presented in Figures 3 through 7 the parameter price, or
the “deemed arm’s length price” for imported goods has ranged from 4,200 currency
units, which was assumed to be the global arm’s length price in a perfect market, to 9,150
currency units. The prices for the imported good fluctuated not because of the fluctuating
market value of the goods, but because of internal commercial factors in the Brazilian
market.
This result suggests that developing countries need to consider carefully: (1)
domestic market prices of inputs relative to global markets, as well as (2) the domestic
market’s willingness to pays premium prices for foreign goods, before they adopt a
Brazilian transfer pricing system. These factors will impact revenue yield under a
Brazilian system. If either or both of these factors are in play, then Brazilian transfer
pricing methodologies may be making the country attractive to foreign investment at the
expense of local revenue.
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